The current study investigated the perception of intrapersonal, interpersonal, and tool-based grasping possibilities. In Experiment 1, participants judged whether they would grasp planks of wood-presented in ascending, descending, and random orders of length-using one hand (1H), two hands (2H), or with a tool that extended their reach (TH). In Experiment 2, participants physically grasped the planks using 1H, 2H, or TH. In Experiments 3 and 4, the choice of TH was replaced with a choice of grasping the planks with another person (2P). The results showed that presentation order influenced the participants' behavior differently in the judgment and action experiments. The same behavioral patterns, however, were observed when participants switched between 1H and 2H, 2H and TH, and 2H and 2P grasping. The point at which participants judged they would switch between the different modes of grasping, as well as the point at which participants physically switched between the grasping modes, occurred at similar action-scaled ratios. The equivalence of perceiving intrapersonal and interpersonal affordances is discussed.
A fundamental issue in understanding human behavior is determining how individuals spontaneously come together to engage in joint actions. Many everyday tasks require that individuals come together to perform cooperative actions such as moving large desks or tables. What is perhaps most intriguing about basic joint actions is that they often occur without prior planning. That is, cooperating individuals come together and act in real time by perceiving the constraints of the environment and task in relation to the limitations of their own individual capabilities. Interestingly, the ability of individuals to spontaneously act together often parallels the way in which individuals spontaneously employ environmental objects or tools to complete simple tasks. For instance, a single individual can use a dolly (a pushed mobile platform) to move large desks or tables. So when do individuals spontaneously join forces with other individuals or employ environmental tools in the performance of everyday activity? Moreover, how can researchers begin to understand the emergence of such interpersonal or tool-based activity? To answer these questions, it is important to first understand how individuals perceive whether interpersonal or tool-based activity is necessary or even possible. One way to understand this perception is to examine whether individuals perceive interpersonal and tool-based action possibilities in the same way that they perceive intrapersonal action possibilities.
Affordances and Action-Scaled Ratios
Over the last several decades, researchers investigating the perception of basic intrapersonal action possibilities have focused on the concept of affordance and how individuals perceive environmental surfaces and objects in relation to their own bodily dimensions or capabilities (e.g., Carello, Grosofsky, Reichel, & Solomon, 1989; Klevberg & Anderson, 2002; van Leeuwen, Smitsman, & van Leeuwen, 1994; Warren & Whang, 1987) . Affordances are opportunities for action, where the frames of reference for these actions are the relations that exist between an animal and its environment. The term affordance was first introduced by J. J. Gibson (1979) to capture the complementarity of an animal and its environment and to highlight the interdependence of perception and action (Michaels & Carello, 1981; Sanders, 1997; Stoffregen, 2003; Turvey, Shaw, Reed, & Mace, 1981) . Thus, to perceive an affordance is to perceive what an environmental surface, object, or event offers a perceiver relative to the action capabilities or effectivities 1 of that perceiver (Michaels, 2003; Reed, 1996; Turvey & Shaw, 1979) . For instance, individuals perceive the climbability of stairs not by the height of the stair risers but by the height of the risers relative to their own leg length (Warren, 1984) . This latter example highlights the foundational work of Warren (1984) . Measuring leg length (L) and riser height (R) using the same units, Warren found that the resulting dimensionless ratio (R/L) predicted critical shifts in perception and action. This ratio not only predicts whether an individual will perceive a stair riser as climbable, it also captures the affordance of stair-climbability across different individuals. Dimensionless ratios such as this one are commonly referred to as body-or action-scaled ratios or pi numbers. With a more general formalism (E/A, where E is the measured environmental property and A is the measured actionrelevant property of an intentional agent), these ratios have been used to investigate such affordances as the cross-ability of gaps (Burton, 1992; Jiang & Mark, 1994) , the reach-and grasp-ability of objects (e.g., Carello et al., 1989; Cesari & Newell, 2000b; Newell, Scully, McDonald, & Baillargeon, 1989) , the walkthrough-ability of apertures (Warren & Whang, 1987) , the walkup-ability of slopes (Kinsella Shaw, Shaw, & Turvey, 1992) , and the sit-ability of surfaces at different heights (Mark, 1987; Mark & Vogele, 1987; Mark, Balliett, Craver, & Douglas, 1990) .
To a large extent, this previous research has centered on two important issues. The first concerns the degree to which action scaling, given its intrinsic nature, is invariant across differences in the absolute metrics of environmental properties or the properties of an individual's action system (e.g., Mark & Vogele, 1987; van der Kamp, Savelsbergh, & Davis, 1998; Warren, 1984) . For instance, research has demonstrated how the grasping patterns of 3-to 5-year old children are determined by the same hand-size to object-size ratio rather than the size of the object grasped or the size of the hand doing the grasping (Newell, Scully, Tenenbaum, & Hardiman, 1989) . The second issue concerns the degree to which the perception of an affordance boundary constrains the mode of activity an individual engages in (e.g., Gardner, Mark, Ward, & Edkins, 2001; Mishima, 1994; Warren & Whang 1987) . For instance, research on reaching behavior has demonstrated not only that individuals perceive what is reachable but that an individual's perception of whether an object can be reached by extending the arm, or by bending the hip and extending the arm, or by bending from an upright posture while extending the arm is determined by a scaling of the distance and height of the object to be reached (Carello et al., 1989; Mark et al., 1997) .
Affordances and Dynamical Systems Theory
Collectively, this previous research has demonstrated that when the ratio between the relevant properties of the environment and an individual's action system reach a value that corresponds to an affordance boundary, other, more stable affordances emerge (or become attuned to), and a goal-directed agent spontaneously reconfigures its action system or behavioral mode accordingly. This spontaneous reorganization of an individual's behavioral mode has led some researchers to argue that the perception and actualization of affordances should be understood from the perspective of dynamical systems theory (e.g., Marsh, Richardson, Baron, & Schmidt, 2006; van der Kamp et al., 1998; Warren, 1984) .
Dynamical systems theory assumes that stable patterns of macroscopic behavior emerge and change over time due to the lawful nonlinear interaction of animal and environmental properties and components (Kelso, 1995; Kugler & Turvey, 1987; Turvey, 1990) . In other words, rather than assuming that stable patterns of behavior are solely the result of mental or representational processes, researchers employing dynamical systems theory argue that the physical and informational constraints that exist between an individual and the environment operate to dynamically self-organize the observed patterns of human behavior (Kelso, 1995; Kugler, Kelso, & Turvey, 1980; van der Kamp & Davis, 1998) .
From a dynamical systems perspective, the behavioral mode that actualizes an affordance is understood to be a stable state (i.e., a state toward which the system is pulled when it is otherwise perturbed from stability) of the animal-environment system, and the action-scaled ratio that captures an affordance is understood to be a control parameter (e.g., Mark et al., 1997; Warren, 1984) . A control parameter is a variable that influences the existence or strength of a behavioral state whereby a system's current state becomes unstable at a critical control parameter value, and the system suddenly transitions to a different, more stable state (Strogatz, 1994) . In addition, the spontaneous and abrupt transition from one stable mode of behavior to another that occurs at affordance boundaries (i.e., critical action-scaled ratios) is referred to as a nonlinear phase transition (Kelso, 1995; Turvey, 1990) . Although such transitions can occur at a single control parameter value, reflecting a critical point transition, nonlinear phase transitions often occur at different control parameter values depending on whether the parameter is scaled from small to large values or from large to small values. This is true for the transition between affordances, with individuals transitioning between different action possibilities at different action-scaled ratios depending on whether the action-scaled ratio that captured the relevant affordance boundary was increasing or decreasing over time (Fitzpatrick, Carello, Schmidt, & Corey, 1994; Hirose & Nishio, 2001; van der Kamp et al., 1998) . In an investigation of one-hand to two-hand grasping by van der Kamp et al. (1998) , individuals were found to transition from one-hand to two-hand grasping at a higher action-scaled ratio than when they transitioned from two-hand to one-hand grasping. That is, objects presented to individuals in ascending size (from smallest to largest) continued to be grasped with one hand beyond the action-scaled ratio at which the individuals grasped the same objects with two hands when the objects were presented in a descending order (from largest to smallest).
This latter type of transition behavior is called hysteresis and occurs when the history of a system's past behavior affects the system's present behavior. Interestingly, the opposite kind of nonlinear behavior can also occur, whereby the transition from one behavioral mode to another occurs at a smaller value of the control parameter when that parameter is decreased over time compared with when it is increased over time. This is known as enhanced contrast (Tuller, Case, Ding, & Kelso, 1994 ) and occurs when a system's future behavior influences its present behavior. This type of behavior has also been observed in affordance research involving perceptual judgments. Hirose and Nishio (2001) found that perceptual judgments of what could be sat on and what could be stepped over were larger for descending orders of presentation than for ascending orders of presentation. Similarly, Fitzpatrick et al. (1994) found that participants who visually or haptically evaluated a slanted surface tended to perceive the boundary between slants that could support upright posture and those that could not to be at a lower angle of inclination when presented in an ascending order than when presented in a descending order.
Affordances and Extended Action Systems
The action systems or effectivities that actualize an affordance need not be limited to systems that entail bodily components of an individual. Rather, an action system can also be comprised of an individual with action capabilities that have been extended with the use of external objects or tools (Bongers, Michaels, & Smitsman, 2004; Bongers, Smitsman, & Michaels, 2003; Shaw et al., 1995; Smitsman, 1997) . Just as changes to an individual's biological degrees of freedom due to growth (or improved dexterity) enable the actualization of different affordances, so does embodying previously external objects or tools enable an individual to actualize different affordances, some of which would have otherwise been unactualizable (Gibson, 1979; Hirose, 2002; Wagman & Carello, 2001 . For example, 3 ft of fresh snow does not afford effective locomotion due to the small surface area of one's feet. Once snow shoes are fitted, however, one's action system becomes more functionally refined, resulting in 3 ft of fresh snow affording effective locomotion.
Tools, then, have a dual function. First they serve as external objects of the environment, separate from a potential user's body, which afford certain actions, such as grasping and throwing (Gibson, 1979; Wagman & Carello, 2003) . Once in use, however, they are no longer external objects but serve another function. They become functional parts of the user's action system, just as integral to the realization of affordances as bodily components (e.g., Bongers et al., 2003 Bongers et al., , 2004 Peck, Jeffers, Carello, & Turvey, 1996; . Mark and colleagues (Mark et al., 1990; Mark & Vogele, 1987 ) demonstrated this by showing that what an individual perceives as too high to sit on increases when blocks are attached to the feet and that the action-scaled ratio that captures the boundary between what was perceived as sit-on-able or not was the same for the body and body-block systems. The significance of these findings is that they not only highlight how individuals are able to accurately perceive action possibilities that entail the use of tools or external objects, they also reveal the role of action-scaled information in constraining such perceptions.
This should also be true for interpersonal activity, in that cooperating individuals come together to actualize interpersonal affordances in much the same way as two limbs come together to actualize intrapersonal affordances. The similitude between affordances at multiple levels of the animal-environment system-the body, the body-tool, and the body-body-is being suggested here, where the emergence of cooperation and coordination at each level (both intrapersonal and interpersonal) is a result of the same intrinsic informational constraints. That is, despite the intuition that cooperative action is substantially different from solo action, an understanding of cooperative activity in terms of affordances suggests that there is a similarity in how joint and solo activity is constrained and organized (Richardson, Marsh, & Schmidt, 2005) . It is important to note that a similitude between the perception and actualization of intrapersonal, interpersonal, and tool-based affordances is consistent with adopting a dynamical systems perspective of affordances. This is because an underlying premise of dynamical systems theory asserts that the same lawful properties of the animal-environment system regulate and constrain the behavior of a broad range of systems, independent of the components that comprise them (Kugler & Turvey, 1987; Schmidt & Turvey, 1994) .
The current experiments were therefore aimed at demonstrating the similarity of perceiving intrapersonal, interpersonal, and toolbased action possibilities and testing whether the theory of affordances and action scaling can be used to understand the spontaneous emergence of interpersonal and tool-based action. We conducted four experiments in which individuals made judgments about the graspability of a series of wooden planks of different lengths or actually grasped and moved planks using either one hand (1H); two hands (2H); two hands with a grasp-extending tool in one hand (TH); or another individual to assist them, with each person holding one end (2P). Of interest was the action-scaled ratio at which individuals or pairs of individuals transitioned from 1H to 2H, 2H to TH, and 2H to 2P grasping. The transitions between perceiving and actualizing 1H, 2H, TH, and 2P affordances were calculated to be functions of the relevant action-scaled ratio (e.g., plank length/hand span for the 1H grasping, plank length/arm span for 2H grasping). By presenting the planks in ascending and descending orders, we also examined the patterning of the transitions between 1H and 2H, 2H and TH, and 2H and 2P. Drawing from the notion that the same dynamic regularities constrain behavior across a broad range of systems, we expected that similar dynamic patterns of behavior would be exhibited for solo and joint action systems and for action systems with embodied tools.
The perception-action task of object grasping was used because it has been used in a number of previous studies examining the perception and actualization of affordances and action scaling (e.g., Cesari & Newell, 1999 Newell, Scully, McDonald, & Baillargeon, 1989) . For instance, researchers have demonstrated how the same hand-size to object-size ratio can be used to predict 1H and 2H grasping for adults, children (Newel, McDonald, & Baillargeon, 1993; Newell, Scully, Tenenbaum, & Hardiman, 1989; van der Kamp et al., 1998) , and individuals with mental or physical disabilities (Savelsbergh, Steenbergen, & van der Kamp, 1996; Savelsbergh, van der Kamp, & Davis, 2001 ). Thus, a grasping task provides a well-studied paradigm for examining shifts from solo action to action involving a tool or cooperative action involving another individual.
Experiment 1
Experiment 1 examined the similarities of perceiving body-and body-tool-based grasping affordances by having individuals judge whether wooden planks of different sizes could be picked up using 1H, 2H, or TH. We expected that participants would perceive the boundary between 1H and 2H grasping and between 2H and TH grasping and, thus, judge that they would transition between 1H and 2H and between 2H and TH at an action-scaled ratio less than 1. Moreover, we expected that a similar patterning of transitions would be observed between 1H-2H and 2H-TH transitions, reflecting the dynamic similitude between body and body-tool action systems.
Method
Participants. Six female and 6 male undergraduate students from the University of Connecticut participated in the experiment as partial fulfillment of a course requirement. The participants had an average hand span of 20.10 cm (SD ϭ 0.89 cm) and an average arm span of 168.8 cm (SD ϭ 7.57 cm).
Materials. Three sets of narrow wooden planks, 2 cm high ϫ 6.5 cm wide, were used as objects. Each set contained 69 planks that varied in length from 2 cm to 35 cm (in 1-cm intervals) and from 80 cm to 2.5 m (in 5-cm intervals). The planks were kept behind a curtain, out of sight of participants, and were presented to participants on a 10-cm-high shelf that stood on a 3.2-m-long ϫ 80-cm-high table.
A 1.25-m-long lifting tool, which consisted of a metal claw attached to the end of a wooden handle, was placed on the table next to participants. This tool, when grasped at the base of the handle, extended a participant's reach by approximately 1.2 m. When used by someone with an arm span greater than 1.3 m, the tool could be used to lift planks up to or greater than 2.5 m long. By holding the handle in one hand and extending the claw so that it clamped (grasped) onto one end of a wooden plank, participants could then grasp the other end of the plank with their free hand and lift the plank successfully.
Procedure. Individual participants were required to make perceptual judgments about how they would 2 grasp and lift the wooden planks, with 1H, 2H, or TH from the shelf to the tabletop, with the instruction that if they were to grasp and move the planks, they could only do so by touching their ends. It was made clear to a participant that this was purely a perceptual judgment experiment and at no stage would they be required to physically grasp and move the wooden planks. To ensure that the judgments were based on a correct understanding of how the planks could be grasped, both with the hands and with the tool, the experimenter performed three demonstrations, one with a plank that could be grasped with 1H, one with a plank that required 2H, and one with a plank that required use of TH.
Each participant completed three trials in which the sequence of planks was presented one by one in an ascending, descending, and random order. To eliminate any possible confounds that could occur due to participants becoming aware of the number of planks used during the ascending and descending trials, only planks up to and including 5 plank lengths after the point of transition were presented to a participant. Specifically, for the ascending trials, planks were presented to participants one by one, starting with the smallest plank (2 cm) and then in an ascending order (3 cm, 4 cm, 5 cm, etc). During the presentation of the smaller set of planks (2 cm to 35 cm), a transition from 1H to 2H was deemed to have occurred once a participant perceived 5 planks in a row as requiring 2H to grasp. Following the presentation of the 5th plank perceived as requiring 2H, the experimenter began presenting the larger set of planks (80 cm to 250 cm) in an ascending order. As with the 1H-2H transition, the transition from 2H to TH was deemed to have occurred when a participant perceived that 5 planks in a row required the tool to be grasped and lifted. The trial ended after the 5th plank perceived as graspable with the tool was presented. A similar procedure was used for the descending trial, with the only difference being that a participant was presented with the 250-cm plank first and then presented with planks in a descending order until 5 planks in a row were perceived as only requiring 2H to grasp. Planks were then presented in a descending order from the 35-cm plank until 5 planks in a row were perceived as requiring 1H. All 69 planks were presented to participants during the random order of presentation. Presentation order was counterbalanced across participants (but with the random condition always occurring second), and a different set of planks was used for each trial.
A participant stood at the center of the table with his or her eyes closed and arms held comfortably at the sides. This ensured that a participant was not able to see how the experimenter placed the planks out on the table and, moreover, was not able to extend his or her hands or arms in order to gain any physical information about the graspability of the plank. After a plank was placed on the shelf, the experimenter signaled the participant to open his or her eyes and make a response. The participant responded verbally by indicating whether he or she would grasp the wooden plank with 1H, 2H, or TH by saying "one," "two," or "three," respectively. After making a response, the participant was instructed to close his or her eyes again and wait for the next plank to be placed on the table. Following the three trials, anthropometric measures of hand span (length between the end of thumb and index finger of dominant hand) and arm span (length between the end of right-hand index finger and left-hand index finger with arms outstretched at shoulder height) were taken with an accuracy of 1 mm.
Design and analysis. The experiment had a 2 (transition: 1H-2H, 2H-TH) ϫ 3 (presentation order: ascending, random, descending) repeated measures design. To determine the action-scaled ratio at which the participants judged that they would transition between 1H and 2H and 2H and TH grasping, we calculated the mean plank length in centimeters at which each participant transitioned from 1H to 2H or from 2H to TH for each presentation order and then divided by hand span or arm span, respectively (for the descending trials, the transition reflects a change from TH to 2H or from 2H to 1H grasping). For example, in the case of 1H-2H transitions, this was done, first, by determining the length of the shortest plank lifted with 2H and for which all planks longer than this plank were also lifted with 2H and, second, by determining the longest plank lifted by 1H and for which all planks shorter than that were also lifted by 1H (van der Kamp et al., 1998) . The sum of these two plank lengths divided by 2 (PL t ) was then divided by the participant's hand span to obtain the perceived point of transition as an action-scaled ratio (AS t ).
Results and Discussion
It was expected that participants would correctly perceive the boundaries between 1H, 2H, and TH grasping. Accordingly, the point at which the participants judged that they would transition between these different modes of grasping was expected to result in AS t s less than 1. Consistent with this expectation, participants judged that they would transition between 1H and 2H grasping and between 2H and TH grasping at average AS t s of 0.74 and 0.97, respectively. Interestingly, an inspection of Table 1 reveals that the participants judged that they would transition between 1H and 2H grasping at a lower AS t for the ascending order of presentation compared with the descending order of presentation. This was also the case for the 2H-TH transitions, with participants judging they would transition between 2H and TH grasping at a lower AS t for the ascending order of presentation compared with the descending order of presentation.
To examine whether this effect of presentation order was significant, we conducted a 2 (transition) ϫ 3 (presentation order) repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) on AS t for each participant. The analysis revealed a significant effect of order, F(2, 22) ϭ 21.92, p Ͻ .05, indicating that participants judged the point of transition to be lower for the ascending compared with the descending order of presentation. The effect of presentation order was verified by a post hoc analysis that found the difference between the ascending and descending orders to be significant ( p Ͻ .05) for both 1H-2H and 2H-TH transitions.
The effect of presentation order indicates that participants tended to exhibit enhanced contrast (see Figures 1a and 1b) . A close examination of the individual data confirmed this, with 10 of the 12 participants exhibiting enhanced contrast for both the 1H-2H and 2H-TH transitions. Of the 2 remaining participants, 1 exhibited hysteresis for both transitions, whereas the other exhibited a critical point transition for both transitions. As with the previous findings of Fitzpatrick et al. (1994) and Hirose and Nishio (2001) , this result suggests that for the ascending and descending orders of presentation, the participants perceptually anticipated having to transition between the different affordances. Such a result is consistent with the perception of affordances being prospective, whereby the perception of affordances can be understood as being the process of detecting what action possibilities lie ahead (Turvey, 1992; Turvey & Carello, 1986; Turvey et al., 1981) .
Recall that we expected there to be a dynamic similitude between the perception of the body and body-tool affordances. The fact that the effect of presentation order was the same for the 1H-2H transitions and the 2H-TH transitions appears to provide initial evidence for this similitude. Indeed, the similarity in the patterning of the judgments for the 1H-2H and 2H-TH transitions would seem to indicate that tool-based action possibilities are perceived in the same way as intrapersonal action possibilitiesthat is, by means of intrinsic action-scaled information. Not surprisingly, however, the 2 (transition) ϫ 3 (presentation order) ANOVA conducted on AS t yielded a significant effect of transition, F(2, 22) ϭ 39.36, p Ͻ .05, with participants judging that they would transition between 2H and TH grasping at a higher AS t than between 1H and 2H grasping. This discrepancy was partially due to the fact that when grasping the planks with 1H or 2H, participants needed to extend the tips of their fingers over the ends of the planks. At a minimum, this required participants to have their grasping fingers (e.g., the middle finger and thumb for a 1H grasp, the middle finger of each hand in a 2H grasp) over the plank ends (which were 2 cm high/deep) in order to grasp and lift the planks successfully. Thus, planks less than 4 cm of a participant's hand span could not be grasped with 1H, and planks less than 4 cm of a participant's arm span could not be grasped with 2H. Note that this 4-cm grasping region results in an asymmetry in 1H and 2H grasping, in that 4 cm is a much greater proportion of the 1H action system than of the 2H action system. Consequently, the action ratios at which the participants judged that they would transition between 1H and 2H grasping and between 2H and TH grasping were normalized by subtracting 4 cm from each participant's hand span and arm span. Specifically, the normalized action-scaled ratio (nAS t ) was calculated as PL t /(hand span Ϫ 4 cm) for the 1H-2H transition and as PL t /(arm span Ϫ 4 cm) for the 2H-TH transition. Note. Standard deviations are in parentheses. PL 1 ϭ the average plank length at which participants' perceptual judgments shifted between one-hand (1H) and two-hands (2H) and between 2H and tool (TH) grasps for each ordering of planks; AS t ϭ the average action-scaled ratio (PL t divided by hand or arm span) at each transition point; nAS t ϭ the average normalized AS t values. Consistent with the analysis of AS t presented above, a 2 (transition) ϫ 3 (presentation order) repeated measures ANOVA conducted on nAS t also resulted in a main effect of presentation order, F(2, 22) ϭ 22.61, p Ͻ .05, with participants judging that they would transition between 2H and TH grasping at a lower AS t for the ascending order of presentation compared with the descending order of presentation. Of more interest was that there was no longer an effect of transition, F(1, 11) ϭ 2.32, p Ͼ .15, with nAS t for the 1H-2H and 2H-TH transitions being comparable (see Table 1 ). The analysis of nAS t did yield a significant Transition ϫ Presentation Order interaction, F(2, 22) ϭ 3.56, p Ͻ .05, with the nAS t s for the ascending trials being slightly lower for the 1H-2H transition than for 2H-TH transition. However, this appeared to be a result of participants perceiving the tool as being potentially awkward to use-several participants indicated this to the experimenter during debriefing.
Although our theorizing does not require that the point of transition between 1H and 2H and between 2H and TH grasping occur at the same AS t , the correspondence of nAS t for the 1H-2H and 2H-TH transitions further highlights the similarity with which participants in the current experiment perceived body-and bodytool-based action possibilities. This is perhaps best demonstrated by the fact that participants judged they would transition between 1H and 2H grasping and between 2H and TH grasping at exactly the same nAS t for the random order of presentation (0.98). Taken in conjunction with the similarity in the patterning of the judgments across the three presentation orders, the results of the current experiment provide clear evidence that the theory of affordances and action scaling can be used to understand the spontaneous emergence of tool-based activity as well as individual activity.
Experiment 2
Experiment 2 was aimed at extending the findings of Experiment 1 by having individuals actively grasp and move the wooden planks used in Experiment 1 using 1H, 2H, or TH. Given that the results of Experiment 1 indicated that normalizing the AS t , provided a more appropriate quantity for examining the similarities and differences between the 1H-2H and 2H-TH transitions, analysis in the current experiment (and in Experiments 3 and 4) was conducted using nAS t as the dependent measure.
Method
Participants. Three female and 9 male undergraduate students from the University of Connecticut participated in the experiment as partial fulfillment of a course requirement. The participants had an average hand span of 21.72 cm (SD ϭ 1.08 cm) and an average arm span of 183.77 cm (SD ϭ 5.49 cm).
Materials and procedure. The same materials and procedure as in Experiment 1 were used, with the exception that instead of making perceptual judgments about how they would grasp and lift the wooden planks, participants in the current experiment were instructed to physically grasp and move the planks from the shelf to the tabletop. As in Experiment 1, the experimenter demonstrated how this could be done with 1H, 2H, and TH, using a different plank length for each demonstration.
Results and Discussion
The current experiment was aimed at replicating and extending the findings of Experiment 1 by demonstrating that participants physically transition between 2H and TH grasping in much the same way as they physically transition between 1H and 2H grasping. An inspection of Table 2 reveals that, as in Experiment 1, participants spontaneously shifted between 1H and 2H grasping and 2H and TH grasping at comparable nAS t values. In contrast to the perceptual judgments made by participants in Experiment 1, however, participants in the current experiment actually transitioned between 1H and 2H grasping and between 2H and TH grasping at a higher AS t for the ascending order of presentation compared with the descending order of presentation.
To examine whether this effect of presentation order was in fact reliable, we conducted a 2 (transition: 1H-2H, 2H-TH) ϫ 3 (presentation order: ascending, random, descending) repeated measures ANOVA on the nAS t values for each participant. The analysis revealed a main effect for presentation order, F(1, 11) ϭ 11.07, p Ͻ .05, indicating that the difference in the point of transition for the ascending order of presentation was significantly higher than that found for the descending order of presentation. This was true for both the 1H-2H and 2H-TH transitions (there was no effect for transition, F[1, 11] ϭ 2.76, p Ͼ .12), with post hoc analysis finding the difference between ascending and descending orders to be significant for both the 1H-2H and 2H-TH transitions ( ps Ͻ .05). The ANOVA also yielded a significant Transition ϫ Presentation Order interaction, F(2, 22) ϭ 5.77, p Ͻ .05, with participants making the shift between 1H and 2H grasping and between 2H and TH grasping at similar nAS t s for the random and ascending orders of presentation, whereas for the descending order, the nAS t for the 2H-TH transition was greater than that for the 1H-2H transition. This was confirmed in post hoc Note. Standard deviations are in parentheses. PL t ϭ the average plank length at which participants' perceptual judgments shifted between one-hand (1H) and two-hands (2H) and between 2H and tool (TH) grasps for each ordering of planks; AS t ϭ the average action-scaled ratio (PL t divided by hand or arm span) at each transition point; nAS t ϭ the average normalized AS t values.
analysis, with the difference in nAS t between the 1H-2H and 2H-TH transitions being significant for the descending order ( p Ͻ .05). As in Experiment 1, this difference was likely due to the fact that participants found the tool unfamiliar or awkward to use and, thus, were more comfortable grasping wooden planks with 2H. The significant effect of presentation order found in the current experiment was opposite to the effect found in Experiment 1, with participants making the transition between action modes at a higher nAS t value for the ascending orders than for the descending orders of presentation. Whereas participants in Experiment 1 tended to exhibit enhanced contrast, participants in the current experiment tended to exhibit hysteresis. This can be seen in Figure  2 , which shows the percentages of 2H (see Figure 2a) and TH (see Figure 2b ) grasps as a function of presentation order. A closer examination of the individual data revealed that for 1H-2H transitions, 9 of the 12 participants exhibited hysteresis, 2 participants exhibited enhanced contrast, and the remaining participant exhibited a critical point transition. Similarly, for 2H-TH transitions, 9 participants exhibited hysteresis, 2 exhibited critical point transitions, and 1 exhibited enhanced contrast.
The tendency for participants to exhibit hysteresis is consistent with previous work examining the dynamic transition between grasping affordances (van der Kamp et al., 1998) and, like the tendency of participants to exhibit enhanced contrast in Experiment 1, provides strong evidence that the actualization of affordances should be understood and explained dynamically. The question of why participants exhibit enhanced contrast when making perceptual judgments about the 1H, 2H, and TH affordances and hysteresis when actualizing these same grasping affordances is an intriguing one and is discussed in more detail in the General Discussion. At this point, it is worth noting that although this result was not anticipated, the few studies that have previously examined the manner in which individuals transition between affordances have produced results consistent with the transition differences found between this experiment and Experiment 1. That is, studies that have required individuals to make judgments about affordances (Fitzpatrick et al., 1994; Hirose & Nishio, 2001 ) have tended to observe enhanced contrast, whereas the experiment by van der Kamp et al. (1998) , in which individuals physically actualized an affordance, found that participants tended to exhibit hysteresis.
It also worth noting that from a dynamics perspective of affordances, the critical prediction is of some form of nonlinear shift in behavior (i.e., a spontaneous or sudden shift between behavioral modes) as opposed to a steady, gradual increase in the frequency of a new mode of behavior and a linear decrease in occurrence of the old mode of behavior. Although dynamical systems perspectives have not determined a priori when hysteresis versus enhanced contrast should occur, either phenomenon is compatible with the theory and can be viewed as evidence of nonlinear phase transitions (Tuller et al., 1994) . Rather critically, however, results of studies finding hysteresis and enhanced contrast using comparable sequencing of stimuli (increasing or decreasing gradually in size) are incompatible with traditional psychophysical, social judgment, or priming perspectives (e.g., Helson, 1964; Herr, 1986; Herr, Sherman, & Fazio, 1983; Manis & Paskewitz, 1984) . From such perspectives, persisting in the use of a previous judgmental category versus shifting to use a new judgmental category is determined by the degree of difference between the immediate stimuli being evaluated and the preceding set of stimuli. The studies that differ by finding hysteresis or enhanced contrast do not, however, differ methodologically in the degree of gradualness of stimulus changes (i.e., do not involve small increases in the former and large discrepancies in the latter studies). Therefore, such discrepancies in results are challenging to reconcile with priming-or adaptation-level explanations for judgmental phenomena.
Despite the contrasting effects of presentation order to those found in Experiment 1, the current findings further illustrate the dynamic similitude by which action scaling constrains the perception and actualization of body and body-tool affordances. This was demonstrated by finding that participants exhibited the same hysteresis effect when transitioning between 1H and 2H grasping and between 2H and TH grasping. Finding that the participants transitioned at similar nAS t s for the random and ascending orders of presentation also highlights the similarity of perceiving the bodyand body-tool-based grasping affordances. Experiments 1 and 2 also reveal the embodied nature of tool-based activity by showing that individuals were able to accurately perceive their abilities with the tool, despite never having seen it before (or having practiced its use). This finding is consistent with the findings of Mark et al. (1990) , in which participants with blocks attached to their feet were able to perceive the sit-ability of surfaces despite not being permitted to sit while wearing the blocks.
A natural extension of Experiments 1 and 2 was to ask whether action scaling could also explain the spontaneous emergence of joint activity. More specifically, we wanted to examine whether the perception and actualization of cooperative interpersonal ac- tivity is similar to the perception of solo activity. Experiments 3 and 4 investigated this possibility by asking participants to judge and grasp the wooden planks with either 1H, 2H, or together with another person.
Experiment 3
Although there has been no research examining the dynamic similitude between intrapersonal and interpersonal affordances, the dynamic similitude of intrapersonal and interpersonal action systems has been demonstrated by researchers interested in movement control and coordination. In particular, Schmidt and colleagues (e.g., Richardson et al., 2005; Schmidt & O'Brien, 1997; Schmidt & Turvey, 1994) have shown how the rhythmic movements of two visually coupled individuals unintentionally and intentionally exhibit patterns of coordinated action that are the same as those found when a single individual coordinates the rhythmic movements of two limbs. Mottet, Guiard, Ferrand, and Bootsma (2001) have also demonstrated a similitude in the dynamics of a onehanded, two-handed, or two-person Fitts law task. Specifically, the authors found that the movement organization of participants performing an aiming task, with either one hand (moving a pointer back and forth between two stationary targets), two hands (moving both the pointer and the targets), or another individual (one individual moving the pointer and the other moving the targets) exhibited the same dynamics (i.e., had the same changes in nonlinearity as the index of difficulty was increased).
Drawing on these findings, Experiment 3 asked participants to make perceptual judgments about how they would grasp and move wooden planks of differing lengths with either 1H, 2H, or the help of another individual. As was the case in Experiment 1, we expected that the point (as a normalized AS t , nAS t ) at which participants judged that they would transition between 1H and 2H grasping and between 2H and two-person (2P) grasping would be less than 1. Moreover, the patterning of transitions (e.g., hysteresis, enhanced contrast) between 1H and 2H grasping and 2H and 2P grasping was expected to be similar, highlighting the dynamic similitude of perceiving intrapersonal and interpersonal action possibilities.
Method
Participants. Six female and 6 male undergraduate students from the University of Connecticut participated in the experiment as partial fulfillment of a course requirement. Participants had an average hand span of 21.62 cm (SD ϭ 1.79 cm) and an average arm span of 177.89 cm (SD ϭ 7.99 cm).
Materials and procedure.
The same materials and procedure as in Experiment 1 were used, with the exception that participants were instructed to judge whether they would grasp the wooden planks with 1H, 2H, or 2P-with an imagined other.
3 Thus, as well as demonstrating how the planks could be grasped with 1H and 2H, the experimenter also described how 2 people (the participant plus another individual) could lift the planks by having 1 person at each end of a plank.
Results and Discussion
As expected, participants judged that they would transition between 1H and 2H grasping and between 2H and 2P grasping at AS t s of less than 1. This can be seen from an inspection of Table  3 . Table 3 also reveals that, like participants in Experiment 1, participants in the current experiment judged that they would transition between 1H and 2H grasping at a lower AS t for the ascending order of presentation compared with the descending order of presentation. This was also the case for the 2H-TH transitions, with participants judging that they would transition between 2H and TH grasping at a lower AS t for the ascending order of presentation compared with the descending order of presentation.
A 2 (transition: 1H-2H, 2H-2P) ϫ 3 (presentation order: ascending, random, descending) within-subject ANOVA conducted on nAS t verified that this effect of presentation order was reliable, F(2, 22) ϭ 25.21, p Ͻ .05. Figure 3 shows the percentages of 2H (see Figure 3a) and 2P (see Figure 3b ) grasps as a function of presentation order. It is clear from these graphs that for both the 1H-2H and 2H-2P transitions, participants tended to exhibit enhanced contrast. A close inspection of the data confirmed this, with 11 of the 12 participants exhibiting enhanced contrast for the transitions between 1H and 2H grasping and 10 of the 12 participants exhibiting enhanced contrast for the transitions between 2H and 2P grasping. Post hoc analysis also confirmed that the difference between the ascending and descending orders of presentation was significant for both 1H-2H and 2H-2P transitions ( ps Ͻ .05). Note. Standard deviations are in parentheses. PL t ϭ the average plank length at which participants' perceptual judgments shifted between one-hand (1H) and two-hands (2H) and between 2H and joint (2P) grasps for each ordering of planks; AS t ϭ the average action-scaled ratio (PL t divided by hand or arm span) at each transition point; nAS t ϭ the average normalized AS t values.
Finding that participants tended to exhibit enhanced contrast replicated the perceptual judgment findings of Experiment 1 and those of Fitzpatrick et al. (1994) and Hirose and Nishio (2001) . Of more importance, however, was finding that the effect of presentation order was the same for the 1H-2H and 2H-2P transitions. That is, the ANOVA revealed neither an effect of transition, F(2, 22) Ͻ 1, nor a Transition ϫ Presentation Order interaction, F(2, 22) ϭ 1.69, p Ͼ .21, with participants judging that they would transition between 1H and 2H grasping and between 2H and 2P grasping at similar nAS t values. Thus, not only do these findings highlight the dynamic similitude between the perceptual judgment of intrapersonal and interpersonal affordances, they also provide the first empirical evidence that the perception of cooperative action possibilities is action scaled and can be studied using the theory of affordances. Moreover, taken with the findings of Experiment 1, the current results indicate that the spontaneous emergence of joint activity also parallels the way in which individuals spontaneously use environmental objects or tools to complete many simple tasks.
To further investigate the dynamic similitude between the perception of body, body-tool, and cooperative affordances, we conducted a final experiment in which participants were required to physically grasp wooden planks either alone or together. Although participants in the current experiment tended to exhibit enhanced contrast, the findings of Experiment 2 suggest that participants might exhibit hysteresis when physically grasping and moving the planks together with another individual. Thus, this final experiment was also needed to further investigate the contrasting effects of presentation order on judging and actualizing affordances.
Experiment 4
Experiment 4 was aimed at extending the findings of the previous experiments by uncovering whether the actualization of 2H-2P grasping also reflects the same dynamic and action-scaled regularities as 1H-2H and 2H-TH grasping.
Method
Participants. Twenty-eight undergraduates from the University of Connecticut participated in partial fulfillment of course requirements. The participants were randomly paired to form 14 same-sex dyads. This resulted in 7 male pairs and 7 female pairs. The participants had an average arm span of 176.64 cm (SD ϭ 7.56 cm). The difference in arm span between participants in a pair ranged from 0 cm to 17.5 cm, with an average difference of 7.28 cm (SD ϭ 5.08 cm).
Materials. A set of 102 wooden planks, 2 cm high ϫ 10 cm wide, was used in each condition. The planks varied in length from 80 cm to 2.5 m, in 5-cm intervals, and there were three planks of each length.
The experimenter presented the wooden planks by placing them on a 2.6-m-long conveyer belt that moved at a speed of 0.9 m/s (see Figure 4) . The experimenter placed the planks on the end of a conveyer belt behind a curtain. The planks then moved along the conveyer belt until they emerged from behind the curtain and slid down a ramp onto a 54-cm-wide ϫ 3-m-long table (at no time during the experiment were participants able to see all of the planks or the experimenter placing the planks on the conveyer belt). After the planks had landed on the table, participants were required to lift planks, turn around, and move the planks 4.3 m to a 3-m-wide ramp that stood opposite the table. The ramp was constructed so that after participants had placed a plank on it, it would slide down behind a curtain to be collected by an experimenter for the next trial.
A standard VHS video camera was used to record the participants as they completed each trial. The video recording was also streamed in real time to a television monitor positioned behind the curtain so the experimenter could view the participants as they completed the experiment.
Procedure. After both participants in a pair arrived and signed an informed consent form, they were told that the experiment was investigating object lifting and that they would be required to grasp and move a set of narrow wooden planks from the table (once a plank had slid off the conveyer belt) to the ramp on the opposite side. As in the previous experiments, the participants were instructed that they could only grasp and move a plank by touching its ends and that this would require them to lift planks either alone using 2H or together with each participant grasping one end of a plank. The experimenter and his assistant then demonstrated how the planks could be lifted, using an 80-cm plank for the 2H demonstration and a 250-cm plank for the 2P demonstration.
Each pair completed three trials in which the sequence of planks was presented in a steady stream on a conveyer belt in an ascending, descending and random order. Participants began each trial by standing next to each other in front of the conveyer belt. The experimenter positioned the wooden planks on the center of the conveyer belt so that when the planks slid off the end of the belt and down the ramp they came to rest with the center of the plank aligned with the center of the table. By watching the television monitor positioned behind the curtain, the experimenter was able to present the planks in a continuous stream, with each plank being placed on the belt while the previous plank was being lifted from the table. This ensured that the participants completed the experiment at a comfortable, self-selected but steady tempo. The three planks of each length were presented in sequence for each order of presentation (i.e., ascending order: 80 cm, 80 cm, 80 cm, 85 cm, 85 cm, 85 cm, 90 cm, 90 cm, 90 cm, etc.; random order: 155 cm, 155 cm, 155 cm, 230 cm, 230 cm, 230 cm, 95 cm, 95 cm, 95 cm, etc.; descending order: 250 cm, 250 cm, 250 cm, 245 cm, 245 cm, 245 cm, 240 cm, 240 cm, 240 cm, etc.). This was done to counteract any possible turn-taking effects-that is, by presenting participants with three objects of the same length in a continuous stream, we ensured that participants who took turns would alternately receive the object of new size.
As in the previous experiments, all 102 planks were presented to the pair for the random order, whereas only those planks whose lengths were less than or equal to the 5th plank length after the transition from 2H to 2P in the ascending order and from 2P to 2H in the descending order were presented to the participant pair. Given that 3 planks of each length were presented to participants sequentially, this resulted in 15 planks being presented to participants after the transition hand occurred. For the ascending order, the point of transition from 2H to 2P was deemed to have occurred once a pair stopped lifting the planks alone and had, with each other, grasped and moved 5 different plank lengths (15 planks in total) in a row. For the descending order, the point of transition from 2P to 2H was deemed to have occurred once the participants in a pair stopped lifting the planks together and had, on their own using 2H, grasped and moved 5 different plank lengths (15 planks in total) in a row. Orders were counterbalanced across participant pairs, with the exception that the random sequence was always presented second. Once participants had completed the three orders of presentation, participants completed a variety of questionnaires about the tasks, after which their arm spans (length between the end of right-hand index finger and left-hand index finger with arms outstretched at shoulder height) were measured with an accuracy of 1 mm. Participants were then debriefed about the true purpose of the experiment and thanked for their participation.
Design and analysis. Experiment 4 had a 2 (participant arm span: smaller, larger) ϫ 3 (presentation order: ascending, random, descending) ϫ 2 (gender: male, female) mixed design, with participants' arm span and gender as the within-subject factors. Note that for each pair, the nAS t values for the participant with the longer arm span and the nAS t values for the participant with shorter arm span were computed and analyzed (hence, the withinsubject factor of participant arm span), rather than the average nAS t value being taken for each pair.
Results and Discussion
The current experiment was aimed at extending the findings of the previous experiments by demonstrating that participants physically transition between 2H and 2P grasping in much the same way as they physically transition between 1H and 2H grasping. In particular, we expected that the patterning of transitions would be consistent with the findings for the 1H-2H grasping behavior investigated in Experiment 2, reflecting the dynamic similitude between the perception and actualization of intrapersonal and interpersonal grasping affordances. Consistent with this expectation, participants in the current experiment transitioned between 2H and 2P grasping at a higher AS t for the ascending order of presentation compared with the descending order of presentation (see Table 4 ). This not only reflects a patterning of transitions similar to that observed for the 1H-2H transitions in Experiment 2 but, taken in comparison with the findings of Experiment 3, parallels the contrasting effects of presentation order observed between Experiment 1 and 2. Specifically, participants in Experiment 3 exhibited enhanced contrast, whereas participants in the current experiment exhibited a patterning of transitions consistent with hysteresis. This hysteretic effect of presentation order is clearly displayed in Figure 5a , where percentages of 2P grasps are plotted as a function of presentation order.
A 2 (participant arm span) ϫ 3 (presentation order) ϫ 2 (gender) mixed-design ANOVA conducted on the nAS t values for each participant in a pair revealed that the effect of presentation order was significant, F(2, 24) ϭ 20.30, p Ͻ .05, with 10 of the 12 pairs exhibiting hysteresis. The remaining 2 pairs exhibited enhanced contrast. It is important to appreciate that in addition to the current findings revealing a similar patterning of transitions between 1H and 2H grasping and between 2H and 2P grasping, a comparison of Tables 4 and 2 also reveals that the point at which participants transitioned between 2H and 2P grasping was similar to that found for the 1H-2H transitions in Experiment 2. To test whether the current nAS t values were similar to those observed in Experiment 2, we conducted independent-samples t tests for each presentation order comparing the average nAS t values for each pair in the current experiment with the nAS t values found for the 1H-2H transitions in Experiment 2. Although this analysis revealed a significant difference between the 1H-2H (0.93) and 2H-2P (0.83) transitions for the random order of presentation ( p Ͻ .05), the difference between the 1H-2H (0.95) and 2H-2P (0.94) transitions for the ascending order of presentation was not found to be significant ( p Ͼ .6), nor was the difference between the 1H-2H (0.76) and 2H-2P (0.72) transitions for the descending order of presentation ( p Ͼ .6). The similarity between the 2H-2P and 1H-2H grasping transitions is most easily seen in Figure 5b , where the percentages of 2-effector grasps (2H grasps for the 1H-2H transition and 2P grasps for the 2H-2P transition) for the transitions in Experiment 2 and Experiment 4 are plotted as a function of the ascending and descending presentation orders.
Interestingly, the 2 (participant arm span) ϫ 3 (presentation order) ϫ 2 (gender) mixed-design ANOVA yielded a significant main effect of participant arm span, F(1, 12) ϭ 21.97, p Ͻ .05, with the participant who had the longer arm span in a pair making the transition between 2H and 2P at a lower nAS t than the participant with the shorter arm span. There was also a significant Participant Arm Span ϫ Presentation Order interaction, F(2, 24) ϭ 13.40, p Ͻ .05, with the difference in nAS t between the longer armed and shorter armed participants in a pair being greatest for the ascending order and smallest for the descending order. The transition between 2H and 2P grasping during the ascending and random orders tended to occur around the time the smaller participant in the pair could no longer lift the planks comfortably using 2H-the larger participant transitioned at a smaller nAS t value in order to accommodate the participant with the shorter arm span. The greater the difference between the shorter and longer armed participants in a pair, the lower the point of transition was for the longer armed participant. For the descending order, this effect occurred less (thus the significant Participant Arm Span ϫ Presentation Order interaction), given that the participants continued to lift the planks together well beyond the point that both participants could lift the objects with 2H. In summary, the results of Experiment 4 were consistent with the findings of the previous experiments and capture the dynamic similitude of perceiving and actualizing intrapersonal and interpersonal affordances. They also support the notions that the spontaneous emergence of joint activity results from the perception of interpersonal affordances and that the realization of such affordances is action scaled. This latter point is important, as no previous research has demonstrated that the perception of simple interpersonal or joint activity is action scaled. Indeed, previous studies investigating affordances in a social context have only involved determining whether an individual can perceive the affordances of another person (Ramenzoni, Riley, Davis, & Snyder, 2005; Stoffregen, Gorday, Sheng, & Flynn, 1999) or if an observer can perceive what another person affords them (Gunns, Johnston, & Hudson, 2002) . Such studies address affordances at the level of the solitary individual. Experiments 3 and 4, however, examined affordances at the level of the interpersonal unit. Thus, the current findings provide the first clear indication that the affordance concept can be used to understand the spontaneous emergence of social action.
General Discussion
The current study was aimed at demonstrating the similarity of perceiving intrapersonal, interpersonal, and tool-based action possibilities. More generally, we attempted to highlight how the theory of affordances and action scaling can be used to understand the spontaneous emergence of interpersonal and tool-based action. Four experiments were conducted in which individuals made perceptual judgments (Experiments 1 and 3) about whether they would grasp wooden planks (Experiments 1 and 3) or they actually grasped and moved these planks (Experiments 2 and 4) aloneusing one hand, two hands, or a tool that extended their grasping capabilities-or cooperatively, using another to assist them. Of interest was the AS t at which individuals or pairs of individuals transitioned from 1H to 2H, 2H to TH, and 2H to 2P grasping and the patterning of the transitions between 1H and 2H, 2H and TH, and 2H and 2P grasping.
Collectively, the results of the four experiments were consistent with the expectation that participants would transition from 1H to 2H, 2H to TH, and 2H to 2P in a similar manner, thereby supporting the hypothesis of a dynamic similitude between the perception and realization of body, body-tool, and interpersonal affordances. Specifically, the results revealed a striking similarity in the descending and ascending nAS t values across 1H, 2H, TH, and 2P grasping. The point and patterning of transitions for the ascending and descending orders was almost exactly the same for the 1H-2H and 2H-2P transitions, and despite the awkwardness of using the novel tool, the effects of presentation order for the 2H-TH transitions were also very similar to those found for the 1H-2H and 2H-2P transitions. Thus, the current results suggest that the spontaneous emergence of joint or tool-based activity results from the perception of action-scaled animal-environment relations. The current results also highlight the functional equivalence of body, body-tool, and body-body action systems. That is, body-tool and social action systems can be understood and studied as a single synergy or effectivity (Marsh et al., 2006) .
It is worth noting that the average nonnormalized AS t for the 1H-2H transitions (0.73) found in Experiments 1, 2, and 3 is comparable to that found previously (e.g., Cesari & Newell 1999; van der Kamp et al., 1998) . Recall that normalizing the AS t involved subtracting a constant magnitude from the respective effector length (i.e., 4 cm for the participants' hand span and arm span), and although this resulted in relatively consistent ratios across the four experiments, it is clear that future research should obtain the magnitude of the maximum possible object that can be grasped as the measure of the action-relevant property.
Enhanced Contrast for Perception and Hysteresis for Action
The similar occurrence of hysteresis and enhanced contrast for the 1H-2H, 2H-TH, and 2H-2P transitions reflects the dynamic similitude of perceiving and actualizing body-, body-tool-, and body-body-based affordances. However, why participants exhibited enhanced contrast when making judgments and hysteresis when actualizing the grasping affordances is unclear. Indeed, although we predicted that individuals would exhibit nonlinear phase transitions, we did not expect there would be a difference in the patterning of these transitions for the judgment and action experiments.
Differences between judgments of an affordance and the actualization of an affordance have been found previously and have led some researchers to question whether judgments should be considered a valid method of investigating the perception of affordances (Heft, 1993; Jiang & Mark, 1994; Pagano & Bingham, 1998; Pepping & Li, 2005; Rochat & Wraga, 1997) . These arguments draw from finding that judgments about whether an affordance can be actualized in a certain manner do not always correspond with whether an individual will actualize an affordance in that way (Bootsma, 1989; Mark et al., 1997; Pagano & Bingham, 1998; Warren & Whang, 1987) . A number of studies have also found that judgments reflect systematic underestimations (Mark, 1987; Pepping & Li, 2000a; Pufall & Dunbar, 1992) or overestimations (Carello et al., 1989; Mark et al., 1997; Pepping & Li, 2000a Warren & Whang, 1987) of affordance boundaries. These latter findings are interpreted as reflecting the conservative nature of judgments, whereby actors attempt to maintain a "margin of safety" to minimize their exposure to potentially dangerous situations (Jiang & Mark, 1994; Mark, Jiang, King, & Paasche, 1999; Pufall & Dunbar, 1992) . Mark and colleagues have also suggested that differences between the judged and the actual boundary of an affordance indicate the difference between absolute affordance boundaries-the absolute limit of an action system's capability to perform a particular mode of action-and preferred affordance boundaries-the point at which actualizing an affordance in a certain way is no longer comfortable or efficient (for more details, see Mark et al., 1997) .
The current findings, however, indicate another possible difference between judged and actualized affordance boundaries. Namely, the dynamic patterning of judged affordance boundaries appears to be opposite to the dynamic patterning of actualized affordance boundaries. Although it is difficult to make any strong claims about why this is the case (given that the experiments were not designed to investigate this finding), it is possible that this difference further indicates that judgments do not provide accurate data about the perception of affordances (Heft, 1993; Jiang & Mark, 1994; Mark et al. 1990; Oudejans, Michaels, Bakker, & Dolne, 1996) . It is also possible that actualizing an affordance provides additional (and sometimes more appropriate) sources of information about affordance boundaries and that this additional information is responsible for the differences observed between the judging and actualization experiments. Indeed, Mark et al. (1990) and Oudejans et al. (1996) have argued that activity (even unrelated activity) provides more information about action capabilities and that these additional sources of information act to tune an individual's perception-action system such that more "accurate" or functional behavior is observed.
It bears mention that our results cannot be easily explained by traditional representation-based, judgment-and decision-making perspectives. That is, traditional explanations for why judgments of psychophysical dimensions such as length, height, weight, and temperature are affected by the adaptation level (Helson, 1964) or contextual distribution (Wedell, 1995; Wedell, Parducci, & Geiselman, 1987) posed by prior stimuli have argued that the phenomena of one's judgment being "assimilated" to the preceding judgments (as in hysteresis) or contrasted in a direction away from the preceding judgments (as in enhanced contrast) can be explained by comparable processes. The same explanation is used for social judgment models, which focus on noetic (semantic) processes to explain how attitudes, person perception, social comparison and self-judgments are affected by the interpretative frame or on judgmental processes that occur when previous stimuli prime semantic categories (e.g., Herr, 1986; Herr, Sherman, & Fazio, 1983; Manis & Paskewitz, 1984; Stapel & Winkielman, 1998) . Whether expressed in judgments or in action, the key factor determining whether assimilation versus contrast occurs is how large a discrepancy there is between the preceding stimuli or primes and the new stimulus. With minimal difference between a new stimulus and the preceding ones, assimilation or hysteresis should occur, according to such theories. Therefore, in the case of our studies, such theories would always predict that hysteresis would dominate, given the gradual nature of the change in plank length in the ascending or descending conditions.
Cooperative Action and Affordances
Although finding comparable action-scaled shifts for solo and joint action is interesting, there is no reason to expect that this will always be the case. What is unique about the particular affordance(s) studied here is that the grasping affordances were quantitatively nested. Figure 6 illustrates the structure of 1H, 2H, TH, and 2P grasping affordances as defined by the results of the four experiments. Implied in the action of moving an object with one hand or with two is the salient possibility that something that extends one's effectivities quantitatively will allow for moving longer objects. However, another tenet of dynamical systems approaches is that there are qualitatively new possibilities of action as a new synergy or coordinative structure emerges. Although these affordances were not examined in the current experiments, hints of such differences are suggested by the differences between the random conditions of Experiment 2 and Experiment 4. Specifically, when the dynamical pressure of a previous trajectory of action was not present, the pull to cooperative action appears to have been stronger than the pull to solo action (Experiment 4). This suggests that affordances defined at an interpersonal level are stronger attractors than self-similar affordances defined in relation to action systems that involve the individual self with inanimate tools.
One reason why the 2P grasping may have functioned as a stronger attractor than TH grasping is that a cooperative interpersonal or social unit reflects a more substantial change in an individual's action system than does embodying a simple tool. Indeed, the former is not only more flexible and adaptive, it also allows for the actualization of an extremely broad range of affordances, including many that can only be actualized by an interpersonal or social unit. In social psychological terms, the 2P action system is a situation in which a social unit temporarily emerges to form a "fragile we" within a "mutually shared social field" (Asch, 1952) . In other words, because other people (in contrast to tools) offer a more global change in the affordance and effectivity structure of the animal-environmental system, the 2P condition moves the individual away from simple embodiment (acting with a tool) toward joint activity and socially embodied cooperation. In this sense, examining the affordances of a social unit or synergy, as well as the information that specifies social affordances, might allow one to better understand and determine the point at which mere behavioral coordination of movement with another becomes teamwork-where a new unit of action, a social synergy, emerges. If so, hysteresis might reflect the beginnings of a process that Figure 6 . The experimentally defined structure of the nested 1H (one-hand), 2H (two-hand), TH (tool), and 2P (two-person) grasping affordances. nAS t ϭ normalized action-scaled ratio.
yields an emergent social unit (dyad, group, team), and different magnitudes of hysteresis (and enhanced contrast) could provide a measure of social unity or rapport (or the lack thereof).
Conclusion
The four experiments presented here demonstrate that individuals can perceive tool-based and interpersonally based affordances. These experiments also extend the role of action scaling from solo action systems to action systems that entail an effectivity-extending tool, be it physical or social. The current results also highlight how individuals spontaneously employ the use of a tool or another person when their own effectivities are insufficient to utilize a given affordance. More broadly, the current results challenge the egocentric view of affordances by showing how solo actions are but a special case of action within an environment that is filled with other organisms as well as things. Indeed, by demonstrating the similitude of body, body-tool, and body-body systems, the current experiments highlight how affordances and effectivities are mutually nested and similarly constrained at all levels of the animal-environment system.
